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“Human behavior flows from three main sources: desire, emotion, and knowledge,” 
~ Plato 
 
1. Introduction 
It is always appealing to understand the human behavior under diverse circumstances. It is 
like being in a science lab testing the outcome of particular environment settings. That 
particular environment is boundless, making it more engaging. Furthermore, the outcomes are 
most likely unstable given the dynamic merit of human being. At times, the results meet our 
predictions but sometimes they do not. These may narrow down conclusions from other 
findings or widen the gap. 
Entertained by the spirit, we construct an experiment to extract the “true” behavior of 
individuals with settings that most likely reflect daily interactions. We are particularly 
interested in the settings of social dilemma where individuals’ decisions are at odds to the 
interest of the society.  
We arranged an experiment consisting of two sessions,  each of which contains sixteen one-
shot prisoner’s dilemma games. We set up random matching games so a player will only have 
one chance to meet with particular opponent. We set up payoff perturbation to test whether 
players change their propensity toward particular strategy. Players will perfectly recall their 
previous strategies, however, they have no information on their opponents’ previous strategy. 
We also introduced framing effect in the second session of the game to compare players’ 
propensity with or without the effect.  
We barely interact with people in static environment. Even if, two individuals will change 
their decisions from time to time. Moreover, we are likely to meet with different individual in 
a particular affair. For example, two individuals from different government agencies meet to 
discuss an issue which cannot be solve in one meeting. Their results of their interactions may 
change over time given different incentives they are facing. It is also a possibility that they 
are replace by another colleague. Although he carries the same mission, his respond to 
incentive will not be the same. This leads to us to idea of random-matching games. See 
Ellison (1994) and Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1995) for further discussion. 
Individuals facing the same structure of problem may witness changing incentive. Although 
the changes are barely noticeable, individuals will respond to it one way or another. We 
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accommodate this through payoff perturbation in the game. We are motivated to see how 
players respond to changing payoff in the same structure. Binmore and Samuelson (2001) and 
Hofbauer and Sandholm (2007) present theoretical background of payoff perturbation. 
The final aspect of interaction that we highlight is the counterpart’s previous history. We 
leaves footprints when we walk, so do we when making decisions. These footprints establish 
reputation in an individual which will affect counterpart’s approach during an interaction. For 
example, people look at sellers’ history on past sales in Amazon or eBay before making their 
buying decision. However, records of counterpart’s past information are not always 
observable due to various restrictions or limitations. See Takahashi (2010) for discussion 
about first-order information. 
The result of the experiment showed that most of the times players chose not to cooperate 
throughout different settings that we set. Non-cooperative strategies are witness throughout 
the games with an average of about 83%. Similar to our prediction, players respond 
significantly to changing payoff. Last but not least, we find that game with framing effect 
setting does not differ to that without framing effect. Our results somehow remind us of the 
term homo economicus.  
Our paper consists of five sections. Section 2 explains theory of prisoner’s dilemma game 
and literature review. Section 3 summarizes the experiment design and section 4 highlights 
the findings from the experiment. Section 5 presents our conclusion on the experiment. 
 
2. The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game 
The prisoner’s dilemma has been one of the greatest knowledge creations in the twentieth 
century. A tale of dilemma presents difficult situation that an individual face. Such is so 
common that we can easily evidence it: from children’s bedtime stories, folklore, to real life 
public choice. From theoretical point of view, it provides an essential philosophy in terms of 
human interaction particularly when conflict of interest surface. It is also powerful enough to 
provide justification on how societies are arranged and behave, by explaining tendency of 
each individual’s response (Poundstone, 1992). Furthermore, the theory can be applied to 
answer inquiries in various disciplines and so it establishes itself as a universal concept.1 
                                                
1 Prisoner’s dilemma game was invented by Flood and Dresher in 1950 and got its name from A.W. Tucker 
(Axelrod, 1984).  
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Figure 1 shows that each individual faces two strategies and each shall determine the best 
strategy. The order of the payoff must be temptation (c) the highest, followed by reward for 
cooperation (a), punishment non-cooperation (d), and sucker (b) for being betrayed 
(Rapoport and Chammah, 1965).  
Game theory analysis state that B will be the dominant strategy to that of A if the game is 
played in simultaneous one-shot game and each individual is prohibited from any cheap talk 
or non-binding commitment. Assuming every individual are rational, both players will 
choose B as their dominant strategy. Therefore, (B:B) will be the Nash Equilibrium. Each 
individual’s belief concerning opponent’s strategy is strongly influenced by rationality axiom 
and common knowledge, as long as the game is played simultaneously in a perfect 
information framework (Romp, 1997). 
Strategy B is also theoretically the dominant strategy in finitely repeated games. Using 
backward induction method, each player tends to choose strategy B throughout the game. 
This propensity is the result of assumption that all individuals are rational and tend to 
maximize their gains. This give prisoner’s dilemma games the best response correspondent 
which imply that rational individuals will chose one dominant strategy even if the payoffs 
change. It is worthy to note that Nash Equilibrium strategy in prisoner’s dilemma game is not 
the most efficient one. The more efficient strategy in prisoner’s dilemma game is (A:A). 
Table 1. 2x2 prisoners’ dilemma pure game 
  Player 2 
  A B 
A
 (a1, a2) (b1,b2) 
P
la
y
er
 1
 
B
 (c1,c2) (d1,d2) 
Where: c>a>d>b   
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Several experiment results challenge the solution that game theory offers in prisoner’s 
dilemma game. The results suggest that strategy B may not always be the dominant strategy. 
Cooper et al. (1996) established twenty one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game in which a player 
only have one chance to meet with particular opponent. The results show that subjects went 
through a learning process to play Nash Equilibrium strategy. At the first five games, there is 
about 43% of pairs chose (A:A) strategy. As the games moved on, the proportion of pairs 
choosing such strategy declined. Table 2 shows that there is only about 20% of pairs chose 
A:A in the last five games.  
Table 2. Results of Cooper et al. (1996) 
Games Proportion of (A:A) 
1-5 43% 
6-10 33% 
11-15 25% 
16-20 20% 
Source: Cooper et al. (1996) 
Evidence from Selten and Stoecker (1986) also shows that strategy B is not the dominant 
strategy. They devise supergames prisoner’s dilemma in which a player plays ten games with 
his/her opponent in each session. Their result shows that players tend to cooperate until one 
player defect by choosing strategy B. Hereafter pairs tend to choose (B:B) until the end of the 
game. The propensity of players to cooperate in the early phase of the game is referred as 
tacit coordination.  
Kreps et al. (1982) proposed theoretical background for individuals to cooperate in finitely 
repeated game. Information asymmetries can generate significant proportion of cooperation, 
assuming individuals are self-interested. Andreoni and Miller (1993) establish supergames 
which explain that individuals respond cooperative behavior as the result of learning process. 
Cooper et al. (1996) also show similar cooperative result.   
Kreps et al. (1982) and Bendor (1993) argue that uncertainty may encourage cooperation. 
Recent work by Takahashi (2010) suggest that sustained cooperation can be derive from first-
order information that is a player can observe his opponent’s past action. Experiment results 
by Gong and Yang (2010) show that cooperation rise when players acknowledge current 
opponents and their previous opponents actions. They show that cooperation rate increased to 
45% from the initial 15%. This shows that reputation and learning process is essential in the 
establishment of cooperation. 
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Cooperation may not likely to ascend in successive repeated one-shot prisoner’s dilemma 
game as players are re-matched from one game to another (Gintis et al., 2005). Experiment 
results from Bereby-Meyer and Roth (2006) shows that the average rate of cooperation from 
five sessions of successive repeated one shot prisoner’s dilemma game is relatively small. 
The results ranged from 12.6% to 22.3% as reported in Garapin, Llerena, and Hollard (2010). 
In similar fashion, Garapin, Llerena, and Hollard (2010) reports that the average rate of 
cooperation from four sessions of the game ranged from 15.4% to 29.7% (Table 3). However, 
Vlaev and Chater (2007) find that the percentage of cooperative games in three different 
payoff setting are up to 33%, 50%, and 71%.  The results suggest that the rate of cooperation 
is relatively low compare to that in infinitely repeated game. This may be sensible since 
players are experiencing new opponent each time and they tend to exercise their rationality. 
Table 3. Experiment results of successive one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game 
Session 
Number of 
Subjects 
Proportion of 
(A:A) 
Session 
Number of 
Subjects 
Proportion of 
(A:A) 
BMR-1 10 18.7% GLH-6 14 17.1% 
BMR-2 10 22.3% GLH-7 14 24.3% 
BMR-3 18 21.3% GLH-8 16 15.4% 
BMR-4 18 12.6% GLH-9 12 29.7% 
BMR-5 10 21.6%    
Notes: BMR refers to Bereby-Meyer and Roth (2006) and GLH refers to Garapin, Llerena, 
and Hollard (2010). 
Source: Garapin, Llerena, and Hollard (2010). 
Recent evolutionary game theory has been an essential tool in the identification of different 
types of individuals. Evolutionary stability concept of equilibrium identifies a strategy as 
evolutionary stable if it has higher reproductive success rate than any other strategy. This 
theory implies that cooperation may not be the optimal behavioral pattern, however 
communication of information is essential to justify the existence of cooperation (Brosig, 
2002). See also Frank (1987), Harrington (1989), and Frank et al. (1993) for discussion on 
evolutionary stable outcome and signaling. 
There is one particular insight that we learn from established literature: players are not always 
rational. It also shows that individuals are not homo economicus. Although various 
arrangements may induce incentives to cooperate, in its place, individuals have bounded 
rationality and are influenced by many social and psychological factors such as altruism, 
fairness, and reciprocity. We may look further to Selten and Stoecker (1986) and Cooper et 
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al. (1996) findings which give light in the building of assumptions in game theory, 
particularly assumption of rationality.  
3. Design of Experiment 
Several experiments in individuals decision making process2 and game theory3 shows that 
individuals are not entirely rational. Specifically, individuals do not always pursue von 
Neumann-Morgenstern Expected Utility Function (Mas-Collel et al., 1995). Pradiptyo (2006) 
also state that it is impossible for individuals to be consistent in their decision making, 
contrary to the rationality assumption. Therefore, we implement evolutionary game theory as 
the basis of our experiment design.  
According to evolutionary game theory, the analysis will be applied to settings in which 
individuals can exhibit different forms of behavior and we will consider which forms of 
behavior have the ability to persist in the population, and which forms of behavior have a 
tendency to be driven out by others (Easley and Kleinberg, 2010:209). This theory imply that 
static rationality assumption tend to break down since individuals’ belief will evolve over 
time.  
Alexander (2009) illustrate that cooperative strategy will eventually becomes extinct as 
shown in Figure 1. The arrow represents the population’s evolutionary trajectory over time. 
First, the population belongs to an unstable equilibrium where they cooperate and drive away 
to stable equilibrium where they defect. Note that if small deviation occurs from stable 
equilibrium, the population will be driven back to original equilibrium (Alexander, 2009). 
        Figure 1. The replicator dynamical model of the prisoner's dilemma 
 
       Source: Alexander (2009). 
We design our experiment using evolutionary game theory concept in the sense that 
individuals may not be making open decisions. Individuals will make decision according to 
the state of the environment that he or she is experiencing. The learning process that 
individuals will go through is the fact they adjust their decision according to the environment. 
                                                
2 See Allais (1953) and Tversky and Kahneman (1979) in decision making under risk; Elsberg (1961) in 
decision making under uncertainty; Holt (1979) in preference reversal.  
3 Cooper et al. (1996), Selten and Stoecker (1986), Pradiptyo (1998) 
Defect Cooperate 
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Their adjustments may not always be the most rational decision according to traditional game 
theory but will reflect the evolutionary process. 
We introduce payoffs variability to test whether individuals are consistent in the decision 
making process as theory suggests (Table 4). Variability in payoff within prisoner’s dilemma 
structure have been introduced in previous experiments such as Komorita, Sweeney, and 
Kravitz (1980) and Bonacich, Shure, Kahan, and Meeker (1976). Payoff variability reflects 
the size of fear, greed, and gains from cooperation. Ahn et al. (1998) shows that players 
responded significantly to particular change in payoff. 
Table 4. Payoffs distribution4 
 
d/a ! 75% and b = 0 
(low coordination benefit) 
d/a " 25% and b = 0 
(high coordination benefit) 
[(c-a)/a] ! 75% and b = 0 
(high coordination cost) 
Combination R 
(Game I, V, IX, XIII) 
Combination S 
(Game II, VI, X, XIV) 
[(c-a)/a] "25% and b = 0 
(low coordination cost) 
Combination T 
(Game III, VII, XI, XV) 
Combination U 
(Game IV, VIII, XII, XVI) 
Notes: 
- The value of a is Rp100,000; if [(c-a)/a] ! 75%, the maximum (minimum) value of c is Rp200,000 
(Rp175,000); if [(c-a)/a] "25%, the maximum (minimum) value of c is Rp125,000 (Rp105,000); if d/a ! 75%, 
the maximum (minimum) value of d is Rp95,000 (Rp75,000); if d/a " 25%, the maximum (minimum) value of d 
is Rp25,000 (Rp5,000). 
Variability in the distribution of payoffs is set by utilizing a method analogous to Goldfeld-
Quandt heteroscedasticity test in econometrics. Initially, we set payoffs a as the reference 
point. The distribution of a will assemble as quartiles if the distribution is divided evenly into 
four. As the Goldfeld-Quandt test suggest, the second and third quartile are eliminated. Thus, 
increasing variability of payoffs only uses two extreme distributions: the first quartile ([c-a]/a 
                                                
4 See Appendix B for payoffs from each of 16 games 
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and d/a with a maximum of 25%) and the fourth quartile ([c-a]/a and d/a with a maximum of 
75%).  
We expect the extreme distribution of payoffs to ease hypothesis testing on whether 
individuals are influenced by the variability of payoffs, even in the same structure. We will 
test whether distribution of strategy in various combinations is statistically different or not. If 
in fact there is no significant difference, we can state that individuals behave rationally as 
theory suggest. If the difference is significant, we may argue that present rationality 
assumption is lacking evidence in empirical level.  
Bendor et al. (1991), Axelrod (1984), and Donninger (1986) established experiment on 
prisoner’s dilemma game where players only discover their own payoffs. Players are blind to 
opponents’ strategy and payoff. This method is called partial feedback. Bendor (1993) argued 
that partial feedback may induce uncertainty however uncertainty can enhance cooperation in 
some circumstances. We introduce full feedback in our experiment to observe whether 
players’ undertake learning process during the experiment. Full feedback has been 
implemented in an experiment by Bereby-Meyer and Roth (2006). 
Although players have full feedback of their strategies, they do not have any information 
regarding their opponents’ previous strategies.5 This particular information is referred as first-
order information. Players also do not have information regarding their opponents’ previous 
opponents’ strategies (second-order information). See Gong and Yang (2010) for experiment 
results on prisoner’s dilemma game with second-order information. 
In addition, we introduce modification of strategies’ names to test a hypothesis whether 
framing effect influence individuals’ decisions (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986). Framing 
effect is a phenomenon in decision-making process, which state that final decisions tend to be 
diverse if the problem in question is put into different words, albeit the substance is 
unchanged. For example, the tendency of doctors’ decisions to operate with certain procedure 
will change when the statement change from “50% patients fully recover” to “50% patients 
still do not fully recover.” 
The experiment will be conducted in three one-hour classes with a total of 96 individuals. 
There are 32 individuals in each session which will be randomly divided into two groups: 
Majapahit (M) and Sriwijaya (S). They will be seated randomly in a computer booth. Each 
                                                
5 See Takahashi (2010) 
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player receives unique identification, for example S3 and M14, which indicates that the 
player belongs to Sriwijaya group (Majapahit) with order number 3 (14).6   
There are 16 games in the session and each player will play 16 different games in terms of 
payoffs and opponents. This implies that every player will face different opponent without a 
chance meet again until the session finishes. Each player faces a board game in the screen 
where Majapahit (Sriwijaya) will see his or her strategies in row (column). The strategies are 
referred as strategy A and B. Each player will be able to see their past strategies and payoffs 
in their monitor. 
The experiment is open to all academic civics in Universitas Gadjah Mada and the 
experimenter informed that participants would participate in decision-making game. Each 
participant has a chance to earn a maximum (minimum) payoff of Rp200,000 (Rp0). The 
amount of payoff is subject to player’s payoff in particular game which he/she selects 
randomly at the end of the game. The maximum payoff of Rp200,000 is regarded high among 
most participants since most of them are undergraduate students. For comparison, the cost of 
particular lunch menu in faculty’s cafeteria is Rp5,000. Therefore, the maximum payoff is a 
worthy amount for “one-hour job.” 
4. Results of the Experiment 
4.a. General Review 
The players that participated in the experiments have an average age of 23.9 years old. There 
are 65.6% of male participants while the rest are female participants. Most participants are 
undergraduate students which accounted for about 70%. The average monthly income of 
participants are Rp932,552 or about US$100. There are 23% of participants with income 
higher than Rp1 million each month. This statistics signify that the amount of maximum 
payoff is significant to participants since the amount is about 20% of their average monthly 
income. 
First, we present general report on the strategies that players chose during the experiment. We 
start off with strategies that pairs chose during the experiment. Table 5 shows the propensity 
of strategies exercised during the experiment. The proportion of players who chose 
cooperative strategy (A:A) only accounted for 1.2% in the first session. The proportion is 
                                                
6 Sriwijaya and Majapahit are the biggest empires in Indonesian history. Both empires lived in different period 
and do not share anything particular in common. 
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outstripped by the proportion of players who chose non-cooperative or Nash Equilibrium 
strategy (B:B), which tally for 81.8%.  The proportion of cooperative strategy in the session 
with framing effect surprisingly declined.7 
Table 5. Proportion of players’ strategies  
Session 1 A:A 
A:B & 
B:A 
B:B Session 2 A:A 
A:B & 
B:A 
B:B 
Game 1-4 1.05 22.9 76.0 Game 1-4 3.2 16.2 80.7 
Game 5-8 2.10 16.7 81.3 Game 5-8 0.0 13.6 86.5 
Game 9-12 1.1 20.4 78.6 Game 9-12 0.0 16.7 83.3 
Game 13-16 0.5 8.4 91.2 Game 13-16 0.0 11.5 88.5 
Game 1-16 1.2 17.1 81.8 Game 1-16 0.8 14.5 84.8 
Source: experiment results 
The results of our experiment show that players have no difficulty understanding the game, 
particularly in choosing the best strategy. Learning process which has been confirmed in 
many experiments was not evidenced. The end results also show that players tend to be 
rational at the end of the game. The proportion of cooperation is recorded the lowest in the 
last four games. This pattern is in line with previous prisoner’s dilemma experiments. 
Proportion of A:B and B:A strategy are way higher than the cooperative strategy, meaning 
that most player tend to practice their rationality every time by choosing B strategy. Only 
small portion of player chose A and most of them were hoodwinked. 
The proportion of cooperative strategy is relatively low compared to that of previous 
experiments such as Bereby-Meyer and Roth (2006) and Garapin, Llerena, and Hollard 
(2010). Their experiments ended with cooperative rate at least 15% and in one session it was 
close to 30%. Cooperative rate in our experiment only averaged for 1.2% in all sixteen 
games. 
Figure 2 to 3 show the proportion of cooperative and non-cooperative strategy in each game. 
Figure 2 shows that there is no specific pattern on the movement of cooperative strategy 
throughout the sessions. We find that the proportion of the strategy reached the highest in 
combination S and U. This may indicate that players tend to cooperate when the benefit of 
coordination is high. However, the overall proportion of the strategy is so small that we 
cannot make any supposition. 
 
                                                
7 Hereafter, session 1 refers to game without framing effect while session 2 refers to game with framing effect. 
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 Source: experiment results 
Figure 2. Proportion of cooperative strategy (A:A) 
 
Figure 3 shows the proportion of Nash Equilibrium strategy in two sessions. We indicate a 
pattern: proportion of Nash Equilibrium strategy tend to rise respectively from combination 
R, S, and T and slightly diminish in combination U. The diminishing proportion in 
combination U may be due to low coordination cost and high coordination benefit. There is 
an indication that players show responses to the changing payoffs.  
 
 Source: experiment results 
Figure 3. Proportion of non-cooperative strategy (B:A) 
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Figure 4 and 5 reveal the proportion of particular strategy in each payoffs combination group. 
Figure 4 shows no particular pattern in throughout the payoffs combination. We note that the 
proportion of cooperative strategy is relatively higher in combination U. This propensity is 
similar to that in Figure 2, players tend cooperate where the cost of coordination is low and 
the benefit of such is high. 
 
 Source: experiment results 
Figure 4. Proportion of cooperative strategy (A:A) in each payoffs combination 
The pattern in Figure 5 is identical to that in Figure 3. The proportion of Nash Equilibrium in 
combination U is relatively lower. Again, the results suggest that some players change their 
strategy as the payoff change. However, this change is relatively small hence has little effect 
on the overall proportion. 
 
 Source: experiment results  
Figure 5. Proportion of non-cooperative strategy (B:B) in each payoffs combination 
14 
 
 
We move on to analyze players’ individual strategy. Table 6 shows that majority of players 
chose strategy B with a range of 86.2-95.1%. The range of players who did not willing to 
Cooperate increase to 89.1-96.1% after the implementation of framing effect. The results may 
indicate that players are rational even with the implementation of framing effect. There is a 
specific pattern in the proportions of strategies that players chose. The tendency of strategy A 
and cooperate is as follows, the proportion decrease respectively in combination R, S, & T, 
then increase in combination U. The opposite is evidenced in strategy B and not to cooperate. 
The pattern is a strong indication that variability of payoffs influenced players’ decision in 
choosing strategy. 
            Table 6. Proportion of individuals’ strategy in each payoffs combination 
Session 1 R S T U 
A 11.7 8.3 4.9 13.8 
B 88.3 91.7 95.1 86.2 
Session 2 R S T U 
Cooperate 10.9 7.6 3.9 9.6 
Not to cooperate 89.1 92.4 96.1 90.4 
  Source: experiment results  
We compare our findings with results from Ahn et al. (1998). Table 7 shows that players 
responded to variability in payoff from four sessions of finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma 
game. However, the proportion of cooperation is relatively high with average of 37% 
compare to that in our experiment.  
 
          Table 7. Proportion of cooperative strategy in Ahn et al. (1998) 
Strategy Game 1 Game 2 Game 3 Game 4 
Cooperative 44% 37% 32% 35% 
  Source: Ahn et al. (1998) 
Figure 6 shows proportion of male and female players choosing strategy B and not to 
cooperate during the experiment. Female proportion that chose strategy B is higher than male 
proportion. We can see that the proportion of cooperative strategy by both gender increased 
in games with framing effect. The figure shows an indication that there is almost no 
difference between male’s and female’s decisions. 
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Figure 6. Proportion of non-cooperation strategy between genders 
 
We move on to hypothesis testing of experiment results. 
H01: Proportion of strategy A (cooperate) and B (not to cooperate) is the same 
Proportion of strategy A and B is significantly different in the first session. The inference 
from the second session is consistent: proportion to cooperate is significantly different than 
that to not cooperate. The results are strong indication that strategy B and not to cooperate is 
dominant during the experiment (Table 8). It is worthy to note that the proportion of players 
choosing strategy B or not to cooperate increased in the second session. 
Table 8. Proportion inference of strategy in each session 
SESSION 1 
Strategy A Strategy B Proportion A Proportion B p-value 
149 1387 0.10 0.90 0.000* 
SESSION 2 
Cooperate Not to Cooperate 
Proportion to 
Cooperate 
Proportion Not to Cooperate p-value 
123 1413 0.09 0.92 0.000* 
Note: We apply Binomial Test to generate the inference; *, **, *** refers to significant in 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively. 
Source: Experimental result. 
Table 9 shows details regarding proportion of each strategy in every game. The lowest 
proportion of players choosing strategy B is 0.81 while the highest is 0.95. Statistics infer that 
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proportion A and B is significantly different in the first session. Yet again, the proportion of 
strategy in the second session is also significantly different. These results are an early 
indication that players tend to maximize their own gains. 
            Table 9. Proportion inference of strategy in each session1 
Session 1 Session 2 
Game 
Strategy 
A 
Strategy B Proportion 
A 
Proportion 
B 
p-value Game Cooperate 
Not to 
Cooperate 
Proportion 
to 
Cooperate 
Proportion 
Not to 
Cooperate 
p-value 
1 15 81 0.16 0.84 0.000* 1 16 80 0.17 0.83 0.000* 
2 9 87 0.09 0.91 0.000* 2 10 86 0.1 0.90 0.000* 
3 5 91 0.05 0.95 0.000* 3 5 91 0.05 0.95 0.000* 
4 19 77 0.20 0.80 0.000* 4 12 84 0.13 0.88 0.000* 
5 6 90 0.06 0.94 0.000* 5 6 90 0.06 0.94 0.000* 
6 11 85 0.11 0.89 0.000* 6 9 87 0.09 0.91 0.000* 
7 6 90 0.06 0.94 0.000* 7 4 92 0.04 0.96 0.000* 
8 17 79 0.18 0.82 0.000* 8 7 89 0.07 0.93 0.000* 
9 18 78 0.19 0.81 0.000* 9 12 84 0.13 0.88 0.000* 
10 7 89 0.07 0.93 0.000* 10 5 91 0.05 0.95 0.000* 
11 5 91 0.05 0.95 0.000* 11 3 93 0.03 0.97 0.000* 
12 13 83 0.14 0.86 0.000* 12 12 84 0.13 0.88 0.000* 
13 6 90 0.06 0.94 0.000* 13 8 88 0.08 0.92 0.000* 
14 5 91 0.05 0.95 0.000* 14 5 91 0.05 0.95 0.000* 
15 3 93 0.03 0.97 0.000* 15 3 93 0.03 0.97 0.000* 
16 4 92 0.04 0.96 0.000* 16 6 90 0.06 0.94 0.000* 
Note: We apply Binomial Test to generate the inference; *, **, *** refers to significant in 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively.  
Source: Experimental result. 
H02: Proportions of strategies between male and female is the same 
Table 10 shows that gender does not play a significant role during the experiment. Statistics 
infer that male and female decisions are not significantly different. The results show that 
male and female have similar tendency when choosing strategy. 
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   Table 10. Inference of strategy based on gender 
Session Gender  p-value Gender 
Session 1 Male 0.687 Female 
Session 2 Male 0.652 Female 
Note: We apply Binomial Test to generate the inference; *, **, *** refers to significant in 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively.  
Source: Experimental result. 
a. Between-Treatment Hypothesis Testing 
We progress to testing hypothesis testing between specific treatments to the game. 
Specifically we infer the influence of payoffs variability in the game. The inferences are 
essential to extract the true behavior of individuals. 
H03: Players’ propensity toward particular strategy between payoffs combinations is the 
same. 
Table 11 shows statistics inference between payoffs combinations in the first and second 
session. Assuming 5% level of significance, payoffs combinations R & T, S & U, and T & U 
are significantly different. This evidence shows that variability of payoffs indeed influence 
players’ decision making process. Significant difference between combinations T & U (R & T 
and S & U) shows that players responded to different coordination benefit (coordination 
cost), assuming coordination cost (coordination benefit) is held constant. Players’ propensity 
changed slightly in games with framing effect. Combination S & T is statistically different 
while combination S & U is not. Significant difference between combinations S & T is due to 
difference in cost and benefit of coordination. 
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                         Table 11. Inference matrix of payoffs combination 
Session 1 p-value Session 1 Session 2 p-value Session 2 
Combination R 0.119 
Combination 
S 
Combination R 0.106 
Combination 
S 
Combination R 0,001* 
Combination 
T 
Combination R 0,000* Combines T 
Combination R 0,387 
Combination 
U 
Combination R 0,553 
Combination 
U 
Combination S 0,060*** 
Combination 
T 
Combination S 0,030** 
Combination 
T 
Combination S 0,016** 
Combination 
U 
Combination S 0,303 
Combination 
U 
Combination T 0,000* 
Combination 
U 
Combination T 0,002* 
Combination 
U 
Note: We apply Mann-Whitney Test to generate the inference; *, **, *** refers to significant in 1%, 5%, and 
10% respectively.  
Source: Experimental result. 
 
4.b. With and Without Framing Effects Hypothesis Testing 
H04: Players’ propensity toward particular strategy in games with and without framing effect 
is the same. 
We evidenced interesting fact: players’ decisions did not change significantly in games with 
framing effect. Combination R, S, and T in games with and without framing effect is not 
statistically different. Combination U is the only combination which shows significant 
difference in games with framing effect (Table 12). 
Table 12. Inference matrix of payoffs combination with and without framing effects 
Session 1 p-value Session 2 
Combination R 0.691 Combination R 
Combination S 0.639 Combination S 
Combination T 0.433 Combination T 
Combination U 0.029** Combination U 
Note: We apply Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test to generate the inference; *, **, *** refers to significant in 1%, 
5%, and 10% respectively.  
Source: Experimental result. 
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H05: Proportions of strategies in games with and without framing effect is the same 
The result shows that the proportions of strategies in games with and without framing effect 
is not significantly different, assuming the level of significance is 5%. This indicates that 
alteration on the name of the strategy only has little effect on the way players make decision.  
Table 13. Inference on Proportion Before and After Framing Effect 
Test Statistics Significance 
Paired t-test 0.051*** 
Wilcoxon signed rank test 0.051*** 
Sign test 0.061*** 
McNemar Test 0.061*** 
Marginal Homogeneity Test 0.051*** 
        *, **, *** refers to significant in 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
        Source: Experimental result. 
5. Conclusion  
We present an experiment on prisoner’s dilemma game with the concept of evolutionary 
game theory. There are many experiments on prisoner’s dilemma game before, however, the 
experiment was conducted in developed countries. Motivated by difference in social and 
cultural background, we establish the experiment in the context of developing country.  
We design the experiment based on evolutionary game theory which accommodate cultural 
nature of subjects. We arrange two sessions in the experiment; each consists of sixteen one-
shot prisoner’s dilemma game with random matching. During each session, a player will only 
have one opportunity to meet with particular opponent. We allow full feedback after each 
game so player can perfectly recall their past actions. Players do not have any information on 
opponents’ previous actions. We design variability in payoffs to test whether players will 
change their behavior. In addition, we set up framing effect in the second session of the game 
by altering the name of the strategy from strategy A (B) to Cooperate (not to Cooperate). We 
offer maximum payoff of Rp200,000, which is deemed to be a significant amount for 
majority of participants. 
The results of the experiment are rather unique compare to that of existing experiments. First, 
we observe no significant difference between male’ and female’ decision where both tend to 
choose non-cooperative strategy (B). We also observe that players tend to maximize their 
gains by choosing non-cooperative strategy.  
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Pairs also tend to engage in non-cooperative strategy during the experiment, in contrast, only 
1.2% and 0.8% (90% and 92%) chose cooperative (non-cooperative) strategy in session 1 and 
2 respectively. Players also responded to variability in payoff matrix we setup. There is only 
little evidence that players tend to change their decision in games with framing effect. With 
respect to the evolutionary process, we may infer that convergence to non-cooperative 
equilibrium is rather swift. This implies that players altogether adjust quickly to the 
environment during the game.  
We come to a conclusion that subjects are very rational judging from the results of the 
experiment. The evolutionary process was swift since most of the individuals exercise their 
rationality right from the beginning. Moreover, majority of players tend to maximize their 
own gains and show little unselfishness throughout the game. Is the results evidence of homo 
economicus? 
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Appendix A 
Experiment Instruction 
 
Thank you for participating in this experiment. You will be participating in interactive 
decision making experiment. You will be asked to follow the experiment instruction carefully 
and make the best decision. 
The decision you make will determine the money you will receive in the end of the 
experiment. The money you earn in the session will be paid in cash at the end of the 
experiment. If you choose the right strategy, you may earn Rp200,000. However, you may 
also earn nothing if you did not choose the right strategy. 
Attention! You may not communicate with other players during the experiment 
General Instruction 
The experiment consists of two sessions and each session consists of 16 games. Each game is 
not related to the game before or after. Three-game practice session will be commenced 
before the main session begins. Before the game, participants will be divided in to two 
random groups that is Majapahit (M) and Sriwijaya (S). Each group consists of 16 players 
and each player will be assigned a certain number from 1 to 16, which is shown in your 
screen. 
For example, if you get number M3 in your screen, you belong to group M with order 
number 3. If you get number S5 in your screen, you belong to group S with order number 5. 
Each player in group M will play only once with each player in group S, vice versa. Thus, 
each player in each group will only play ONCE with players in other group without any 
chance to meet again. 
Game Strategy 
In each game, each player face two strategies that is A and B. Each player chooses strategy 
which he or she deems the best by clicking the strategy button on the screen. Each player will 
be asked: 
ARE YOU CONFIDENT WITH YOUR ANSWER? 
 
 
If you are not confident with your answer and you want to change it, click “NO” and you will 
be able to change to your desired answer. If you are confident with your answer, click “YES” 
and your answer will be recorded in the server without any opportunity to change the answer. 
YES NO 
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If both players have given their answers, a table on the right side of your screen will display 
the strategy that each player took and how much money they earn from each game. There 
will be 16 games and each player from each group will only play one game with each player 
in the other group. There will be no repetition of games and opponents in each session. 
 
You will have 30 seconds to choose your best strategy 
 
Session II 
Games in the second session of the experiment are similar to the first one. The only difference 
is the strategies. Strategy A will be referred as Coordination, meanwhile, strategy B will be 
referred as No Coordination. Other than the naming of the strategies, the games in the second 
session will be similar to those in the first session. 
Remuneration Method 
Each player will randomly choose one game out of 32 games in two sessions and each player 
will earn an amount of money according to the payoff he or she received in that game. The 
maximum earning is Rp200,000, and if you are not fortunate you may earn nothing or Rp0. 
No players should pay any amount to the experimenter. 
Practice Session 
Practice will be carried out after the moderator finished addressing the general instruction 
before the game commenced. The practice session consist of three games. Each player should 
fully understand the game before it commence. If you are not, the player is urged to request 
the moderator to repeat the practice session. 
Thank you for your participation in the game 
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Appendix B 
Game 1   Game 2  
M gets Rp 100,000 M gets Rp 0  M gets Rp 100,000 M gets Rp 0 
S gets Rp 100,000 S gets Rp 175,000  S gets Rp 100,000 S gets Rp 125,000 
M gets Rp 175,000 M gets Rp 25,000  M gets Rp 125,000 M gets Rp 75,000 
S gets Rp 0 S gets Rp 25,000  S gets Rp 0 S gets Rp 75,000 
Game 3   Game 4  
M gets Rp 100,000 M gets Rp 0  M gets Rp 100,000 M gets Rp 0 
S gets Rp 100,000 S gets Rp 175,000  S gets Rp 100,000 S gets Rp 125,000 
M gets Rp 175,000 M gets Rp 75,000  M gets Rp 125,000 M gets Rp 25,000 
S gets Rp 0 S gets Rp 75,000  S gets Rp 0 S gets Rp 25,000 
Game 5   Game 6  
M gets Rp 100,000 M gets Rp 0  M gets Rp 100,000 M gets Rp 0 
S gets Rp 100,000 S gets Rp 200,000  S gets Rp 100,000 S gets Rp 105,000 
M gets Rp 200,000 M gets Rp 25,000  M gets Rp 105,000 M gets Rp 75,000 
S gets Rp 0 S gets Rp 25,000  S gets Rp 0 S gets Rp 75,000 
Game 7   Game 8  
M gets Rp 100,000 M gets Rp 0  M gets Rp 100,000 M gets Rp 0 
S gets Rp 100,000 S gets Rp 200,000  S gets Rp 100,000 S gets Rp 105,000 
M gets Rp 200,000 M gets Rp 75,000  M gets Rp 105,000 M gets Rp 25,000 
S gets Rp 0 S gets Rp 75,000  S gets Rp 0 S gets Rp 25,000 
Game 9   Game 10  
M gets Rp 100,000 M gets Rp 0  M gets Rp 100,000 M gets Rp 0 
S gets Rp 100,000 S gets Rp 175,000  S gets Rp 100,000 S gets Rp 125,000 
M gets Rp 175,000 M gets Rp 5,000  M gets Rp 125,000 M gets Rp 95,000 
S gets Rp 0 S gets Rp 5,000  S gets Rp 0 S gets Rp 95,000 
Game 11   Game 12  
M gets Rp 100,000 M gets Rp 0  M gets Rp 100,000 M gets Rp 0 
S gets Rp 100,000 S gets Rp 175,000  S gets Rp 100,000 S gets Rp 125,000 
M gets Rp 175,000 M gets Rp 95,000  M gets Rp 125,000 M gets Rp 5,000 
S gets Rp 0 S gets Rp 95,000  S gets Rp 0 S gets Rp 5,000 
Game 13   Game 14  
M gets Rp 100,000 M gets Rp 0  M gets Rp 100,000 M gets Rp 0 
S gets Rp 100,000 S gets Rp 200,000  S gets Rp 100,000 S gets Rp 105,000 
M gets Rp 200,000 M gets Rp 5,000  M gets Rp 105,000 M gets Rp 95,000 
S gets Rp 0 S gets Rp 5,000  S gets Rp 0 S gets Rp 95,000 
Game 15   Game 16  
M gets Rp 100,000 M gets Rp 0  M gets Rp 100,000 M gets Rp 0 
S gets Rp 100,000 S gets Rp 200,000  S gets Rp 100,000 S gets Rp 105,000 
M gets Rp 200,000 M gets Rp 95,000  M gets Rp 105,000 M gets Rp 95,000 
S gets Rp 0 S gets Rp 95,000  S gets Rp 0 S gets Rp 95,000 
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Note: Rp refers to Indonesian Rupiah; 1US$ = Rp9,100; A Big Mac costs Rp19,000. 
Appendix C 
Individuals’ Strategies in Session 1, Round 1 
M: Team Majapahit 
S: Team Sriwijaya  
  Game 
Player Gender 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
M1 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M2 P A B B A B B B B A B B B B B B B 
M3 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M4 L B B B A A A A A A A A B B A B B 
M5 P B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M6 P B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M7 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M8 L A B B A B B B B A B B B B A B B 
M9 L A B B B B B B B A B B B B B B B 
M10 L B B A B B B B B A B B A B B B B 
M11 P B B B B A B B B A B B B B B B B 
M12 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M13 P B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M14 P B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M15 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M16 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S1 P B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S2 L B B B B B B B B A B B A B B A B 
S3 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S4 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S5 L B B B B B B A A B B B A B B B A 
S6 L B B B B B B B B A B B A B B B B 
S7 P B B B B B B B B A B B B B B B B 
S8 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S9 P B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S10 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S11 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S12 L A B B B A B A B B B B A B B B B 
S13 P B B B B B B B B B B B A B B B B 
S14 P B B B A B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S15 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S16 P B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
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Individuals’ Strategies in Session 1, Round 2 
  Game 
Player Gender 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
M1 L B A B A B A B A B B B B B B B B 
M2 P B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M3 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M4 L A A B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M5 P B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M6 P A A A A A A A A B B B B B B B B 
M7 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M8 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M9 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M10 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M11 P B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M12 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M13 P B B B B B B B B B B B A B B B B 
M14 P B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M15 L B B B B B B B A B B B B B B B B 
M16 L B B B A A A B A B B B B B B B B 
S1 P A B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S2 L B B B B B A B B A B B B B B B B 
S3 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S4 L A B B A B B B A A B B B B B B B 
S5 L A B B A B B B A A B A B B B B A 
S6 L B A B A B A A B A A B A B B B B 
S7 P B B B B B B B B B B B B A B B B 
S8 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S9 P B B B B B B B B A B B B B B B B 
S10 L B B B B B B B B A B B B B B B B 
S11 L B B B B B B B A B B B B B B B B 
S12 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S13 P B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S14 P B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S15 L A B B A B B B B B B B B A B B B 
S16 P B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
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Individuals’ Strategies in Session 1, Round 3 
  Game 
Player Gender 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
M1 L B B B B B A B B B A B B A B B B 
M2 P B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M3 L A B B A B B B A B B A B B A B B 
M4 L B A B A B B B B B A B B A B A A 
M5 P B B B A B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M6 P B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M7 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M8 L B B B B B B B B B B B A B B B B 
M9 L B B B B B B B A B B B A B B B B 
M10 L A B B A B A B A B A A B B A B B 
M11 P B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M12 L B B A B B A B B B A B B B B B B 
M13 P B B B B B B B B B B B A B B B B 
M14 P B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M15 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M16 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S1 P A A B A B A B A B B B B B B B B 
S2 L A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A 
S3 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S4 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S5 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S6 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S7 P A B B B B B B A B B B B B B B B 
S8 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S9 P B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S10 L B B B B B B B B B B B B A B B B 
S11 L B A A B B B B A A B B A B B B B 
S12 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S13 P B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S14 P B A B A B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S15 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S16 P B B B A B B B A A B B B B B B B 
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Appendix D 
Individuals’ Strategies in Session 2, Round 1 
M: Team Majapahit 
S: Team Sriwijaya 
A refers to “cooperate” 
B refers to “not to cooperate”  
  Game 
Player Gender 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
M1 L A B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M2 P B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M3 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M4 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M5 P B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M6 P B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M7 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M8 L B B B A B B B B A B B B B B B B 
M9 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M10 L A B B B B B B B A B B A B B B B 
M11 P A B B B B A B A B B B B B A B B 
M12 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M13 P B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M14 P B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M15 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M16 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S1 P B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S2 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S3 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S4 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S5 L A B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S6 L B B B B B B B B A B B A A B B B 
S7 P B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S8 L B B B B B B B B A B B A A B B B 
S9 P B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S10 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S11 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S12 L B B B B B B B B B B B A B B B B 
S13 P A B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S14 P B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S15 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
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S16 P B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
 
Individuals’ Strategies in Session 2, Round 2 
  Game 
Player Gender 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
M1 L B B B B B B B B A B B B B B B B 
M2 P B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M3 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M4 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M5 P B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M6 P A A B B B B B A B B B B B B B B 
M7 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M8 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M9 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M10 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M11 P B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M12 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M13 P B B B B B B B B B B B A B B B B 
M14 P B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M15 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M16 L B A B A A B B A B B B A B B B B 
S1 P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A 
S2 L B B B B B B B B B B B A B B B B 
S3 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S4 L B B B A B B B A A B B B B B B B 
S5 L A B A B B B B B B B B A B B B B 
S6 L A A B B B A B B A B B B B B B B 
S7 P B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S8 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S9 P B B B B B B B B B A B B B B B B 
S10 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S11 L B A B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S12 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S13 P B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S14 P B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S15 L A B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S16 P B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
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Individuals’ Strategies in Session 2, Round 3 
  Game 
Player Gender 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
M1 L A A B B B B B B B B B B A B B A 
M2 P B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M3 L B B B B B A B B B B B B B B B B 
M4 L A A A A A A B B A B B B B B B A 
M5 P B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M6 P B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M7 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M8 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M9 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M10 L B B B A B A B B B B B B B B B B 
M11 P B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M12 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M13 P B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
M14 P B B B B B B B B A B B B B B B B 
M15 L A B B A A B A B B B B B B B B B 
M16 L A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A 
S1 P B B B A B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S2 L A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A 
S3 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S4 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S5 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S6 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S7 P B B B A B A B B B A B B A A B B 
S8 L B B B B B B B B B B B B A B B B 
S9 P B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S10 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B A 
S11 L A A B A B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S12 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S13 P B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S14 P B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S15 L B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
S16 P B B B B B B B B B B B A B B B B 
 
 
 
